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OPINION 
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COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
This matter comes before us on a petition for a writ of 
certiorari filed by the United Industrial, Service, 
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Transportation, Professional and Government Workers of 
North America Seafarers International Union (“Union”) on 
behalf of Ernest Bason, Esq., asking us to review a decision 
by the Virgin Islands Supreme Court.  On December 28, 
2012, the President signed H.R. 6116, “a bill that would 
eliminate our certiorari jurisdiction over final decisions of the 
Virgin Islands Supreme Court and replace it with direct 
review by the Supreme Court of the United States.”  Kendall 
v. Daily News Publ’g Co., 716 F.3d 82, 86 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(citation omitted) (“Kendall I”).  We conclude that we retain 
certiorari jurisdiction over proceedings that were filed in the 
Virgin Islands courts before the date of enactment of H.R. 
6116.  Although we thereby still possess certiorari jurisdiction 
with respect to the proceedings filed by the Union and the 
Government of the Virgin Islands in the Virgin Islands 
Superior Court, we nevertheless must dismiss the Union’s 
certiorari petition as moot.  Accordingly, we cannot—and do 
not—reach the question of “whether title 24, section 374(a) of 
the Virgin Islands Code is harmonious with title 3, section 
113(a) of the Virgin Islands Code.”  We, however, will vacate 
the Virgin Islands Supreme Court’s order and opinion and 
will remand with instructions to the Virgin Islands Supreme 
Court to vacate the portions of the Virgin Islands Superior 
Court’s judgment and opinion that addressed the issue of 
reinstatement. 
 
I. 
 
 Ernest F. Bason, Esq., was employed as an Assistant 
Attorney General with the Virgin Islands Department of 
Justice.  Most Assistant Attorneys General, including Bason, 
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were subject to a collective bargaining agreement, and the 
Union served as their exclusive bargaining representative.  In 
a July 1, 2010 letter, the Virgin Islands Attorney General 
informed Bason that he intended to impose a suspension and 
to terminate his employment.  The Union filed a grievance on 
Bason’s behalf challenging this action.  In a letter dated July 
23, 2010, the Governor of the Virgin Islands accepted the 
Attorney General’s recommendation and approved Bason’s 
immediate termination.  Withdrawing the previous grievance, 
the Union submitted a second grievance on behalf of Bason 
challenging the Governor’s decision.  The second grievance 
went to arbitration.  On January 2, 2011, the Arbitrator 
entered an award determining that the underlying grievance 
was arbitrable and properly before him for resolution.  He 
issued his final award and opinion on April 29, 2011, 
specifically finding that the Governor lacked just cause to 
remove Bason.  In addition, the Arbitrator awarded the 
following remedy: 
 
The Arbitrator awards the Grievant immediate 
reinstatement to his previous employment as an 
Assistant Attorney General and the immediate 
restoration of all emoluments associated with 
his employment as an Assistant Attorney 
General, including without limitation, all related 
benefits and seniority effective July 1, 2010 and 
back pay for the period between the termination 
of the Suspension imposed by the Attorney 
General in his June 7, 2010 letter to the 
Grievant (J-#4) and the Employer’s actual 
reinstatement of the Grievant to his employment 
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as an Assistant Attorney General pursuant to 
this Award. 
 
(Id.) 
 
 On May 9, 2011, the Government of the Virgin Islands 
filed a complaint in the Virgin Islands Superior Court (No. 
ST-11-CV-308).  The Government asked the Virgin Islands 
Superior Court to vacate the arbitration award and to enter a 
declaratory judgment providing that the Virgin Islands Justice 
Department had no obligation to reinstate Bason.  Acting on 
Bason’s behalf, the Union filed its own complaint on June 7, 
2011 (and the Government, in turn, filed a counterclaim) (No. 
ST-11-CV-364).  The Union asked the Virgin Islands 
Superior Court to confirm the arbitration award.  The Virgin 
Islands Superior Court consolidated the two cases.  The 
parties filed summary judgment motions (and the Union also 
filed motions to dismiss and to confirm the arbitration award). 
 
On December 13, 2011, the Virgin Islands Superior 
Court granted in part and denied in part the motions filed by 
the Union and the Government.  In its judgment, the Virgin 
Islands Superior Court vacated the April 29, 2011 arbitration 
award “but only to the extent that it grants relief prior to July 
23, 2010” and ordered “that judgment is entered in Case No. 
ST-11-CV-308 in favor of the Government on Count IV of its 
Verified Complaint to this extent only.”  (A34.)  It likewise 
entered judgment in the Government’s favor as to Count IV 
of its counterclaim “to this extent only.”  (Id.)  The Virgin 
Islands Superior Court confirmed the arbitration award “in all 
other respects” and thereby ordered judgment to be entered to 
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this extent “in favor of the Union in Case No. ST-11-CV-364 
on its Action to Confirm an Arbitration Award.”  (Id.)  It was 
ordered, adjudged, and decreed that: 
 
. . . Ernest F. Bason, Esquire is 
IMMEDIATELY REINSTATED as an 
assistant attorney general in the Virgin Islands 
Department of Justice, Office of the Attorney 
General, with the immediate restoration of all 
employment benefits, seniority, and other 
emoluments of employment effective July 23, 
2010, and back pay from July 23, 2010 to the 
date of his actual reinstatement . . . 
 
(Id.) 
 In its accompanying opinion, the Virgin Islands 
Superior Court considered the Government’s two theories for 
relief:  (1) that the Arbitrator exceeded his authority when he 
ruled that the Union’s grievance was timely filed; and (2) that 
“the arbitrator’s decision to reinstate Attorney Bason violates 
the public policy that assistant attorneys general can be fired 
by the Governor without cause.”  Gov’t of the V.I. v. UIW-
SIU, Nos. ST-11-CV-308, ST-11-CV-364, 2011 WL 
6936479, at *3 (V.I. Super. Ct. Dec. 12, 2011).  According to 
the Virgin Islands Superior Court, the Arbitrator exceeded his 
authority by granting any relief based on the July 1, 2010 
letter (or a June 7, 2010 letter imposing a suspension) because 
the Union withdrew its grievance as to the July 1, 2010 action 
(and never filed a grievance with respect to the June 7, 2010 
suspension).  “Therefore, the award must be vacated to the 
extent that it awards any relief to Attorney Bason prior to July 
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23, 2010.”  Id. at *5.  With respect to the government’s 
second theory, the Virgin Islands Superior Court concluded 
that “[t]he arbitrator’s decision to reinstate Bason is not 
contrary to Virgin Islands public policy.”  Id. at *7 (emphasis 
omitted).  “Therefore, the Court will confirm the immediate 
reinstatement of Ernest Bason, Esquire as an assistant 
attorney general with the Virgin Islands Department of 
Justice, Office of the Attorney General, with all benefits, 
seniority, and back pay retroactive to July 23, 2010.”  Id. at 
*9. 
 
 On December 16, 2011, the Government notified the 
Virgin Islands Superior Court of Bason’s reinstatement, i.e., 
he was directed to report to work on December 19, 2011.  It 
also filed a notice of appeal on December 20, 2011, appealing 
from the opinion and judgment to the Virgin Islands Supreme 
Court.  On March 15, 2012, the Virgin Islands Superior Court 
denied the Government’s motion for a stay of the portion of 
the judgment ordering the Government to pay back pay as 
well as the Union’s motion for contempt and sanctions on 
account of the Government’s alleged failure to pay the 
requisite back pay. 
 
 The Union also moved to dismiss the Government’s 
appeal.  According to the Union, the Virgin Islands Supreme 
Court lacked appellate jurisdiction because neither the Virgin 
Islands Superior Court nor the Arbitrator ever established the 
amount of back pay owed to Bason and because the absence 
of a clear monetary judgment “renders the December 13, 
2011 Opinion and Judgment non-final for purposes of section 
32 of title 4 [of the Virgin Islands Code].”  Gov’t of the 
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Virgin Islands v. UIW-SIU, S. Ct. Civ. No. 2011-0115, 2012 
WL 5901921, at *3 (V.I. Nov. 26, 2012).  “As more fully 
explained in the motion to dismiss, the failure to calculate the 
specific amount of back pay owed to Bason became relevant 
since it caused the Superior Court, in a March 15, 2012 
Order, to deny the UIW-SIU’s motion to hold the 
Government in civil contempt.”  Id. at *3 n.2.  The parties 
were directed to submit supplemental briefing on this 
jurisdictional issue.  On September 10, 2012, the Virgin 
Islands Supreme Court denied as moot the Government’s 
motion to stay the back pay portion of the judgment, noting 
that no monetary judgment had been entered and that the 
Government had never requested a stay of the portion of the 
judgment ordering Bason’s reinstatement.   
 
After hearing oral argument, the Virgin Islands 
Supreme Court disposed of the Government’s appeal in an 
order and opinion entered on November 26, 2012.  In short, it 
reversed “the portion of the decision which mandated Bason’s 
reinstatement.”  Id. at *1. 
 
Accordingly, the Virgin Islands Supreme Court stated 
in its order that “the portion of the Superior Court’s 
December 13, 2011 Opinion and Judgment which authorizes 
Ernest Bason’s reinstatement as an Assistant Attorney 
General is REVERSED” and that “the instant appeal is 
DISMISSED with respect to all issues.”  (A21-A22.)   
Furthermore, the matter was ordered remanded, and “the 
Superior Court is directed to issue a final judgment consistent 
with this Opinion.”  (A22.) 
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In the accompanying opinion, the Virgin Islands 
Supreme Court began with the threshold question of appellate 
jurisdiction.  Title 4, section 32(a) of the Virgin Islands Code 
embodies “the final judgment rule,” which generally requires 
a party “‘to raise all claims of error in a single appeal 
following final judgment on the merits.’”  Id. at *3 (quoting 
Bryant v. People, 53 V.I. 395, 400 (V.I. 2010)).  Both parties 
recognized that the December 13, 2011 opinion and judgment 
did not “technically” constitute a final order because neither 
the Virgin Islands Superior Court nor the Arbitrator 
calculated the amount of back pay the Government must 
remit to Bason.  Id.  The Government proceeded to invoke the 
practical finality rule permitting an appellate court to review 
an order that resolves all non-ministerial issues, but the Union 
claimed that the back pay calculation “is not a purely 
mechanical task” due to the parties’ disagreement as to the 
amount.  Id.  As an alternative basis for appellate jurisdiction, 
the Government claimed that the opinion and judgment 
mandating Bason’s immediate reinstatement constituted an 
appealable injunction under title 4, section 33(b)(1) of the 
Virgin Islands Code. 
 
According to the Virgin Islands Supreme Court, “[t]he 
UIW-SIU is correct that the parties’ dispute as to how the 
Superior Court should calculate any monetary damages 
ultimately awarded to Bason precludes us from exercising 
jurisdiction under the practical finality rule.”  Id. (citing Hard 
Rock Cafe v. Lee, 54 V.I. 622, 627 n.6 (V.I. 2011)).  
However, it also agreed with the Government’s alternative 
theory that an order mandating immediate reinstatement 
constitutes an appealable injunction.  The Union requested 
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Bason’s reinstatement, and the Virgin Islands Superior Court 
could have used its contempt powers if the Government had 
refused to reinstate him within the requisite time period.  
“Accordingly, we possess jurisdiction over this appeal, but 
only with respect to the Superior Court’s directive that the 
Government reinstate Bason.”  Id. 
 
Turning to the merits, the Virgin Islands Supreme 
Court determined that the portion of the Virgin Islands 
Superior Court’s opinion and judgment ordering the 
reinstatement of Bason must be reversed.  “The UIW-SIU 
concedes that, under Section 11 of the Revised Organic Act 
of 1954, the Governor ‘may remove[ ] all officers and 
employees of the executive branch of the government of the 
Virgin Islands, except as otherwise provided . . . under the 
laws of the Virgin Islands, 48 U.S.C. § 1591, and that the 
Virgin Islands Code authorizes the Governor to remove an 
Assistant Attorney General.  See V.I.C. § 113 (‘The Assistant 
Attorneys General shall be appointed by the Governor, and 
shall hold office during the continuance in office of the 
Governor . . . unless sooner removed by the Governor.’).”  Id. 
at *4.  “Assuming without deciding that Assistant Attorneys 
General may unionize pursuant to chapter 14 of title 24 (24 
V.I.C. § 361 et seq.)—as the Superior Court found in its 
December 13, 2011 Opinion—their right to do so is not 
unlimited.”  Id. at *5 (footnotes omitted).  Title 24, section 
374 “expressly provides that ‘[r]ates of pay, hours, salaries, 
employee benefits, terms and conditions of employment and 
all matters relating thereto may be specifically negotiated in a 
collective bargaining proceeding between the public 
employer and the exclusive representative unless otherwise 
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specifically restricted by law.’”  Id.  Although the Union 
attempted to harmonize section 113 and the collective 
bargaining agreement by arguing that the agreement simply 
prescribes the manner and conditions by which terminations 
may take place, “this Court disagrees that any harmonization 
is possible with respect to the reinstatement provisions.”  Id.; 
see also, e.g., id. (“Given that section 113 actually mandates 
automatic discharges of Assistant Attorneys General without 
cause at the conclusion of a Governor’s term, it is not clear to 
this Court how the provisions of the collective bargaining 
agreement which permit reinstatement by an arbitrator of an 
Assistant Attorney General discharged without just cause can 
in any way be reconciled with the statutory enactment.”) 
 
In the end, the Virgin Islands Supreme Court 
concluded that: 
 
Since the portion of the December 13, 
2011 Opinion and Judgment mandating Bason’s 
reinstatement constituted an appealable 
injunction, this Court possesses jurisdiction 
over that portion of the underlying order 
pursuant to section 33(b)(1) of title 4.  As to the 
merits, to the extent Assistant Attorneys 
General may unionize pursuant to title 24, 
chapter 14, we hold that section 113 of title 3 
precluded the arbitrator and the Superior Court 
from mandating that the Government reinstate 
Bason as an Assistant Attorney General.  
Accordingly, we reverse the portion of the 
December 13, 2011 Opinion and Judgment that 
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authorizes Bason’s reinstatement as an 
Assistant Attorney General, and direct the 
Superior Court, on remand, to issue a final 
judgment which is consistent with this Opinion. 
 
Id. 
  
 On November 30, 2012, the Union filed a motion with 
the Virgin Islands Supreme Court to stay enforcement of the 
judgment pending the filing of an application for a writ of 
certiorari in this Court.  By December 13, 2012, Congress 
passed H.R. 6116, which in short “would eliminate our 
certiorari jurisdiction over final decisions of the Virgin 
Islands Supreme Court and replace it with direct review by 
the Supreme Court of the United States.”  Kendall I, 716 F.3d 
at 86 (citation omitted).  The President of the United States 
signed H.R. 6116 into law on December 28, 2012.  Section 3 
of this legislation expressly provides that “[t]he amendments 
made by this Act apply to cases commenced on or after the 
date of the enactment of this Act.”  On December 21, 2012, 
the Union filed a motion asking the Virgin Islands Supreme 
Court to render an advisory opinion on the following 
question:  “Whether H.R. 6116 applies to all cases 
commenced at the trial level on or after its enactment or only 
to appeals from decisions or orders of this court commenced 
on or after the date of enactment.”  (12/21/12 Motion at 1 
(emphasis omitted).)  The Union also filed a motion 
requesting certified docket entries.  On January 15, 2013, the 
Virgin Islands Supreme Court issued its mandate and denied 
all three motions.  It noted that the Government’s appeal 
constituted an interlocutory appeal from the issuance of an 
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injunction and that it never enjoined the Virgin Islands 
Superior Court from conducting any proceedings during the 
pendency of the appeal.  Furthermore, mere monetary loss 
resulting from loss of employment did not constitute good 
cause for a stay because “Appellee would be entitled to 
receive back pay in the event Appellee’s certiorari petition is 
granted and this Court’s November 26, 2012 Opinion 
ultimately reversed.”  (1/15/13 Order at 2 (citation omitted).)  
With respect to the advisory opinion motion, the Virgin 
Islands Supreme Court explained that “Appellee has cited to 
no authority, and this Court can find none, for the proposition 
that this Court may properly assist a litigant in interpreting a 
federal statute.”  (Id.) 
 
 On remand to the Virgin Islands Superior Court, the 
Union filed a motion to stay, while the government moved for 
issuance of a final judgment.  The Virgin Islands Superior 
Court heard oral argument on these motions on May 30, 
2013.  To date, the parties’ respective motions are still 
pending. 
 
On January 25, 2013, the Union filed a petition for a 
writ of certiorari with this Court.  On March 8, 2013, the 
Clerk issued an order noting that this Court had just filed an 
opinion in Kendall v. Daily News Publishing Co., “addressing 
the issue of jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari after the 
passage of HR 6116.”  (3/18/13 Order at 1.)  The parties were 
given the opportunity to file jurisdictional submissions, which 
they both did. 
 
This Court filed the following order on April 24, 2013: 
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The foregoing petition for a writ of certiorari 
will not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on 
the basis of H.R. 6116, Pub. L. 112-226, at this 
time.  The petition is granted as to the first 
question presented – i.e., whether title 24, 
section 374(a) of the Virgin Islands Code is 
harmonious with title 3, section 113(a) of the 
Virgin Islands Code.  In addition to such 
arguments as the parties wish to raise on that 
issue, the parties are directed to address whether 
the Virgin Islands Supreme Court’s decision is 
a “final decision” within the meaning of former 
48 U.S.C. § 1613 (1994), in light of that court’s 
remand to the Virgin Islands Superior Court.  
See generally Defoe v. Philip, 702 F.3d 735, 
740-41 (3d Cir. 2012).  Our decision not to 
dismiss this petition at this time does not 
represent a ruling that this Court retains 
jurisdiction over this petition under H.R. 6116, 
Pub. L. 112-226.  That issue will be decided if 
necessary by the panel of this Court that 
considers this appeal on the merits. 
 
(4/24/13 Order at 2.) 
 
After briefing was concluded, the Union filed a 
suggestion of death pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 43(a)(1).  It notified this Court “that on or about 
September 3, 2013 nominal appellant Attorney Ernest Bason 
passed away.”  (Suggestion of Death at 1.)  We asked the 
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Union and the Government to file letter submissions 
addressing the possible effect of Bason’s death on our 
jurisdiction and whether “this matter is now moot because 
Mr. Bason cannot be reinstated to his position as an Assistant 
Attorney General.”  (10/17/13 Letter at 1.)  Both parties did 
so.1 
                                                 
1 On March 19, 2014, we filed our original opinion and 
judgment in this proceeding.  See UIW-SIU v. Gov’t of the 
V.I., 746 F.3d 115 (3d Cir. 2014).  We held that we retain 
certiorari jurisdiction over proceedings that were filed in the 
Virgin Islands courts before the date of enactment of H.R. 
6116.  Although we thereby determined that we possess 
certiorari jurisdiction with respect to the proceedings filed by 
the Union and the Government in the Virgin Islands Superior 
Court, we nevertheless dismissed the Union’s certiorari 
petition as moot on account of Bason’s death.  The Union 
then filed a petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc.  
Relying on the rule recognized by the Supreme Court in 
United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36 (1950), the 
Union argues that, when an appeal or certiorari proceeding is 
dismissed for mootness, the decision under review also must 
be vacated.  Accordingly, it asks this Court  “to clarify its 
March 19, 2014 Opinion to explicitly direct that the entire 
November 26, 2012 Decision of the Supreme Court of the 
Virgin Islands and those portions of the December 13, 2011 
decision of the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands that 
address the issue of reinstatement be vacated.”  (Petition for 
Rehearing at 9.)  The Government filed an opposition to the 
Union’s rehearing petition.  In a May 23, 2014 order, we 
granted the petition for panel hearing and vacated our March 
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19, 2014 opinion and judgment.   
 
On June 2, 2014, the Virgin Islands Supreme Court 
submitted a notice of filing of amicus curiae brief or, in the 
alternative, a motion for leave to file amicus curiae brief in 
support of neither party.  In its proposed amicus curiae brief, 
the Virgin Islands Supreme Court argues at some length that:  
(1) we must refrain from interpreting H.R. 6116 given our 
mootness determination; (2) in any event, we were wrong to 
conclude that we retain certiorari jurisdiction over 
proceedings that were filed in the Virgin Islands courts before 
the enactment date of H.R. 6116; and (3) the Munsingwear 
rule does not apply because we lack supervisory authority 
over the Virgin Islands Supreme Court.  Although the Virgin 
Islands Supreme Court criticizes the manner in which the 
Government has handled this certiorari proceeding, the 
Government nevertheless joined in the arguments advanced in 
this amicus curiae brief.  The Union, however, filed a 
response in opposition to the submission by the Virgin Islands 
Supreme Court. 
 
On July 2, 2014, this Court denied the Virgin Islands 
Supreme Court’s motion to file its amicus brief pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29(a) on the grounds 
that it does not qualify as the “state” under this rule.  We, 
however, granted its alternative motion for leave to file the 
amicus curiae brief pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 29(b).  The Union then filed its response to this 
amicus curiae brief.  
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Nevertheless, it does appear rather unusual and even 
troubling for a court to submit an amicus curiae brief, 
especially where the court in question actually issued the 
decision that is the subject of the appellate or certiorari 
proceeding.  In addition, we find the specific circumstances 
under which this amicus curiae brief was filed to be rather 
problematic.  After all, the Virgin Islands Supreme Court 
could have submitted a brief addressing the question of our 
certiorari jurisdiction under H.R. 6116 when we asked the 
parties to file jurisdictional submissions on this specific 
question or when briefing was concluded.  The Union even 
filed a motion before the effective date of this legislation 
formally asking the Virgin Islands Supreme Court to render 
an advisory opinion answering the question of whether H.R. 
6116 applies to all cases commenced at the trial level on or 
after its enactment or only applies to appeals from decisions 
of the Virgin Islands Supreme Court commenced on or after 
the date of enactment.  Although it now offers its own 
interpretation of H.R. 6116, the Virgin Islands Supreme Court 
adamantly refused to answer the question put to it on the 
grounds that it could not assist a litigant in interpreting a 
federal statute.  It also appears that the Virgin Islands 
Supreme Court could have addressed the possible 
consequences arising out of Bason’s death when the 
suggestion of death was filed and when we asked the parties 
to provide letter submissions regarding the possible effect of 
this death on our jurisdiction.  In the end, the Virgin Islands 
Supreme Court did not submit an amicus curiae brief until 
after we rendered our initial opinion and judgment and 
granted the Union’s petition for panel rehearing.  While the 
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This proceeding presents us with two threshold 
questions:  (1) whether we retain certiorari jurisdiction over 
proceedings that were filed in the Virgin Islands courts before 
the date of enactment of H.R. 6116; and (2) even if we 
thereby retain certiorari jurisdiction in the present 
circumstances under H.R. 6116, whether Bason’s death moots 
the current certiorari proceeding.  While we conclude that we 
still possess certiorari jurisdiction over proceedings that were 
filed in the Virgin Islands courts before H.R. 6116’s 
enactment date, we will nevertheless dismiss the Union’s 
certiorari petition as moot on account of Bason’s death.  
Accordingly, we cannot—and do not—reach the question of 
“whether title 24, section 374(a) of the Virgin Islands Code is 
harmonious with title 3, section 113(a) of the Virgin Islands 
Code.”2  However, we will vacate the Virgin Islands Supreme 
Court’s order and opinion and will remand with instructions 
                                                                                                             
Union itself merely asks this Court to follow the 
Munsingwear rule and vacate the Virgin Islands Supreme 
Court’s decision, the Virgin Islands Supreme Court goes on 
to critique the interpretation of H.R. 6116 that we offered in 
our initial opinion as well as our determination to consider 
whether we retain certiorari jurisdiction under H.R. 6116 in 
the first place.  In any event, we have fully considered—and 
reject—the various arguments advanced by the Virgin Islands 
Supreme Court on their merits. 
 
2 We likewise do not address the question of “whether 
the Virgin Islands Supreme Court’s decision is a ‘final 
decision’ within the meaning of [§ 1613] in light of that 
court’s remand to the Virgin Islands Superior Court.” 
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to the Virgin Islands Supreme Court to vacate the portions of 
the Virgin Islands Superior Court’s judgment and opinion that 
addressed the issue of reinstatement.3   
                                                 
3 The Virgin Islands Supreme Court argues that we 
ought to refrain from interpreting H.R. 6116 in light of our 
determination that the certiorari proceeding is moot.  It is 
uncontested that, while threshold jurisdictional issues must 
ordinarily be decided before turning to the merits, “there is no 
mandatory ‘sequencing of jurisdictional issues.’”  Sinochem 
Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 431 
(2007) (quoting Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 
574, 584 (1999)).  In Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020 
(2011), the Supreme Court observed that it “has never held 
that it may consider only one threshold issue per case,” id. at 
2033 n.8.  Accordingly, it decided that government officials 
who prevailed on qualified immunity grounds before the 
circuit court could obtain Supreme Court review of a circuit 
court’s decision that their conduct violated the Constitution 
even though the case had otherwise become moot.  Id. at 
2026-36.  We also determine that, given the specific 
circumstances of this certiorari proceeding, it is appropriate to 
begin with the threshold question of our subject matter 
jurisdiction over the current certiorari proceeding pursuant to 
H.R. 6116 before deciding whether Bason’s subsequent death 
otherwise moots this proceeding.  After all, the Court 
specifically directed the parties to address this jurisdictional 
question, and this question was then fully briefed by the 
parties before Bason’s death.  See, e.g., id. at 2033 n.8 
(“Moreover, that issue was fully litigated in this Court”).  As 
our mootness discussion in Section II.B. indicates, the two 
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A. H.R. 6116 
 
 In 1984, Congress authorized the Legislature of the 
Virgin Islands to establish an appellate court for the Virgin 
Islands.  See, e.g., Kendall I, 716 F.3d at 86.  In 2004, the 
legislature created the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands, 
which began to exercise its judicial functions in 2007.  See, 
e.g., Defoe, 702 F.3d at 738-39.  The pre-amended version of 
28 U.S.C. § 1613 states in relevant part that: 
 
The relations between the courts established by 
the Constitution or laws of the United States 
and the courts established by local law with 
respect to appeals, certiorari, removal of causes, 
the issuance of writs of habeas corpus, and 
other matters or proceedings shall be governed 
by the laws of the United States pertaining to 
the relations between the courts of the United 
States, including the Supreme Court of the 
United States, and the courts of the several 
States in such matters and proceedings:  
Provided, That for the first fifteen years 
                                                                                                             
threshold questions are not unrelated.  See, e.g., id. (“[O]ur 
discussion of reviewability is critical to our ultimate 
disposition of this suit.”).  Similarly, the question of 
mootness, which arises out of an unusual and even unique set 
of circumstances, does not represent “a textbook case” for 
immediate dismissal.  Sinochem, 549 U.S. at 435 (“This is a 
textbook case for immediate forum non conveniens 
dismissal.”). 
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following the establishment of the appellate 
court authorized by section 1611(a) of this title, 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit shall have jurisdiction to review by writ 
of certiorari all final decisions of the highest 
court of the Virgin Islands from which a 
decision could be had. . . .  
 
“[U]nlike the United Sates Supreme Court’s certiorari statute, 
§ 1613 is not limited to decisions on federal law.”  Defoe v. 
Phillip, 702 F.3d 735, 743 (3d Cir. 2012).  “We also have the 
discretion to review the Virgin Islands Supreme Court’s 
decisions on local law” and will reverse such a decision if it is 
“manifestly erroneous or inescapably wrong.”  Id.  (citing 
Pichardo v. V.I. Comm’r of Labor, 613 F.3d 87, 96 (3d Cir. 
2010)).  This temporary period of certiorari jurisdiction was 
designed to allow enough time for the new court “to develop 
‘sufficient institutional traditions [of its own] to justify direct 
review by the Supreme Court of the United States.’”  Kendall 
I, 716 F.3d at 86 (quoting § 1613).  Once the Virgin Islands 
Supreme Court established the requisite traditions, it would 
assume the same role as the highest court of any state, i.e., “it 
will be the final authority on Virgin Islands law.”  Defoe, 702 
F.3d at 739.  The Supreme Court would then exercise 
certiorari review over the Virgin Islands Supreme Court’s 
final decisions on questions of federal law, and, in contrast, 
we would no longer possess certiorari jurisdiction as to its 
rulings on questions of either federal or Virgin Islands local 
law.  See, e.g., id. 
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“Recognizing that the Virgin Islands Supreme Court 
might develop sufficient institutional traditions before the 
fifteen-year mark, however, Congress required this Court to 
regularly evaluate and report on its progress.”  Kendall I, 716 
F.3d at 86 (citing § 1613; Defoe, 702 F.3d at 739-40).  The 
Virgin Islands Supreme Court “passed that test with flying 
colors” in 2012 “when a committee of this Court 
recommended to the Third Circuit Judicial Council that 
Congress eliminate our certiorari jurisdiction over Virgin 
Islands Supreme Court decisions in favor of direct review by 
the United States Supreme Court.”  Id. (citing Judicial 
Council of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, 
Report on the Virgin Islands Supreme Court 1 (2012), 
available at 
http://www.visusupremecourt.org/wfData/files/BookletReport
ofVirginIslandsSupremeCourt.pdf)).  The Executive and 
Legislative Branches acted with dispatch on our 
recommendation: 
 
By December 13, 2012, both the House of 
Representatives and the Senate had passed H.R. 
6116, a bill that would eliminate our certiorari 
jurisdiction over final decisions of the Virgin 
Islands Supreme Court and replace it with direct 
review by the Supreme Court of the United 
States.  See An Act to amend the Revised 
Organic Act of the Virgin Islands to provide for 
direct review by the United States Supreme 
Court of decisions of the Virgin Islands 
Supreme Court, H.R. 6116, §§ 1-2, 112th Cong. 
(2012).  President Obama signed H.R. 6116 into 
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law on December 28, 2012. 
  
Id.  Section 1 of this legislation amends § 1613 by striking the 
language granting this Court certiorari jurisdiction over final 
decisions of the highest court of the Virgin Islands.  Section 2 
of H.R. 6116 adds the following section to the statute 
governing the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: 
 
“[28 U.S.C.] § 1260.  Supreme Court of the 
Virgin Islands; certiorari 
 
“Final judgments or decrees rendered by the 
Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands may be 
reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of 
certiorari where the validity of a treaty or statute 
of the United States is drawn in question or 
where the validity of a statute of the Virgin 
Islands is drawn in question on the ground of its 
being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or 
laws of the United States, or where any title, 
right, privilege, or immunity is specially set up 
or claimed under the Constitution or the treaties 
or statutes of, or any commission held or 
authority exercised under, the United States.”  
 
Section 3 of H.R. 6116, entitled “Effective Date,” provides 
that “[t]he amendments made by this Act apply to cases 
commenced on or after the date of the enactment of this Act,” 
i.e., December 28, 2012.4 
                                                 
4 H.R. 6116 states: 
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SECTION 1.  DIRECT REVIEW BY U.S. SUPREME 
COURT OF DECISIONS OF VIRGIN ISLANDS 
SUPREME COURT. 
 
Section 23 of the Revised Organic Act of the Virgin 
Islands (48 U.S.C. 1613) is amended by striking “:  Provided, 
That” and all that follows through the end and inserting a 
period. 
 
SEC. 2.  JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME 
COURT. 
 
(a)  IN GENERAL.—Chapter 81 of title 28, United 
States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following: 
 
“§ 1260.  Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands; 
certiorari 
 
“Final judgments or decrees rendered by the 
Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands may be 
reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of 
certiorari where the validity of a treaty or statute 
of the United States is drawn in question or 
where the validity of a statute of the Virgin 
Islands is drawn in question on the ground of its 
being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or 
laws of the United States, or where any title, 
right, privilege, or immunity is specially set up 
or claimed under the Constitution or the treaties 
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 This Court has addressed the effect of H.R. 6116 on its 
certiorari jurisdiction in two opinions involving Virgin 
Islands Supreme Court decisions on questions of federal law:  
Kendall I, 716 F.3d 82, and In re Kendall, 712 F.3d 814 (3d 
Cir. 2013) (“Kendall II”).  In Kendall I, we decided that this 
legislation does not strip us of our certiorari jurisdiction over 
cases “in which certiorari has been granted and the matter is 
awaiting decision at the time of the bill’s enactment.”  
Kendall I, 716 F.3d at 87.  The Kendall II Court then 
characterized Kendall I as “holding that Congress’s recent 
elimination of the Third Circuit’s certiorari jurisdiction over 
decisions of the Virgin Islands Supreme Court does not 
affect, at a minimum, certiorari petitions filed before the 
                                                                                                             
or statutes of, or any commission held or 
authority exercised under, the United States.” . 
 
(b)  CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—The 
table of sections for chapter 81 of title 28, 
United States Code, is amended by adding at 
the end the following new item: 
 
“1260.  Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands; 
certiorari.” .  
 
SEC. 3.  EFFECTIVE DATE. 
 
The amendments made by this Act apply to 
cases commenced on or after the date of the 
enactment of this Act. 
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effective date of the jurisdiction-stripping act.”  Kendall II, 
712 F.3d at 821 n.3 (citing Kendall I). 
 
 “When interpreting a statute, we normally presume 
that the statute does not apply retroactively—that is, to cases 
pending on the date of the law’s enactment—absent clear 
congressional intent to the contrary.”  Kendall I, 716 F.3d at 
87 (citing Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 576 (2006)).  
As we observed in Kendall I, the presumption against 
retroactivity does not apply to legislation that merely alters 
jurisdiction.  See, e.g., id.   “‘[U]nlike other intervening 
changes in the law, a jurisdiction-conferring or jurisdiction-
stripping statute usually “takes away no substantive rights but 
simply changes the tribunal that is to hear the case.”’”  Id. 
(quoting Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 576-77).  Accordingly, “‘no 
retroactivity problem arises’ with respect to an intervening 
change in jurisdiction ‘because the change in the law does not 
“impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a 
party’s liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with 
respect to transactions already completed.”’”  Id. (quoting 
Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 577). 
 
 This “‘does not mean, however, that all jurisdiction-
stripping provisions  . . . must apply to cases pending at the 
time of their enactment.’”  Id. (quoting Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 
577).  Simply put, a court still looks to generally applicable 
rules of statutory construction to decide whether a statute 
takes away its jurisdiction.  This is exactly what we did in 
Kendall I: 
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After all, “‘[n]ormal rules of [statutory] 
construction’ . . . may dictate otherwise.”  
[Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 577] (quoting Lindh v. 
Murphy, [521 U.S. 320, 326 (1997)]).  Here, 
Congress spoke clearly:  “[t]he amendments 
made by [H.R. 6116]”—that is, the elimination 
of the Third Circuit’s certiorari jurisdiction and 
substitution of such review by the United States 
Supreme Court—“apply to cases commenced 
on or after the date of the enactment of [H.R. 
6116].”  H.R. 6116, § 3.  No matter whether 
“cases commenced” carries a broader meaning 
referring to the filing of a complaint in the 
Superior Court or a narrower meaning referring 
to the filing of a certiorari petition in this 
Court—an issue we need not decide today—
Kendall commenced this case long before H.R. 
6116’s enactment. 
 
Id.  In other words, H.R. 6116 only applies to “cases 
commenced” on or after enactment date, which means that it 
does not apply to “cases commenced” before that date. 
 
 In Kendall I, we addressed—and distinguished—the 
Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Santos v. Guam, 436 F.3d 1051 (9th 
Cir. 2006), which held that Congress’s elimination of the 
Ninth Circuit’s certiorari jurisdiction over the Guam Supreme 
Court (and substitution of direct review by the Supreme 
Court) applied to pending cases.  Kendall I, 716 F.3d at 87.  
“To the extent that Santos interprets Supreme Court precedent 
as holding that jurisdiction-stripping provisions automatically 
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apply retroactively absent an express reservation of 
jurisdiction over pending cases, the Supreme Court 
subsequently rejected such an approach in [Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006)].  See [id. at 584] (rejecting 
this ‘inflexible’ rule advanced by Justice Scalia’s dissent and 
by the Government).”  Kendall I, 716 F.3d at 87.  “More 
importantly,” H.R. 6116 was markedly different from the 
legislation at issue in Santos: 
 
In Santos, the Ninth Circuit addressed a statute 
in which Congress was completely silent about 
the effective date of the jurisdiction-stripping 
provision.  Santos, 436 F.3d at 1053 (explaining 
that Congress did not “express[ ] an intent as to 
the effective date”).  By contrast, Congress was 
explicit that H.R. 6116’s amendments apply 
only “to cases commenced on or after the date 
of the enactment” of the statute.  See H.R. 6116, 
§ 3.  As a result, we retain certiorari jurisdiction 
over all cases “commenced” before the 
President signed H.R. 6116, including this one.  
See Hamdan, [548 U.S. at 584] (drawing the 
negative inference that Congress did not intend 
to eliminate jurisdiction over pending detainee 
habeas petitions where the statute was silent 
about whether its jurisdiction-stripping 
subsection applied to cases even though it 
expressly made two other subsections 
retroactive). 
 
Id. at 87-88. 
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The Government and the Union filed their respective 
Virgin Islands Superior Court actions in 2011, and the 
Government filed its ultimately successful appeal to the 
Virgin Islands Supreme Court in the same year.  Although the 
Virgin Islands Supreme Court entered its order and opinion 
on November 26, 2012, the Union filed its otherwise timely 
certiorari petition on January 23, 2013—after the date of 
enactment of H.R. 6116, i.e., December 28, 2012.  We 
therefore must decide the specific issue that we refused to 
reach in Kendall I:  “whether ‘cases commenced’ carries a 
broader meaning referring to the filing of a complaint in the 
Superior Court or a narrower meaning referring to the filing 
of a certiorari petition in this Court.”  Id. at 87.  Relying in 
particular on the Supreme Court’s decision in Slack v. 
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000), as well as the alleged 
purpose of the legislation, the Government asks us to construe 
this “cases commenced” language to mean the filing of a 
certiorari petition.   Based on the language of the statute, 
analogous legislation, and prior case law, we agree with the 
Union that we retain certiorari jurisdiction over proceedings 
that were filed in the Virgin Islands courts before H.R. 6116’s 
enactment date.  This includes the proceedings filed by the 
Government and the Union in the Virgin Islands Superior 
Court in 2011.  In other words, we believe that “‘cases 
commenced’ carries a broader meaning referring to the filing 
of a complaint in the [Virgin Islands] Superior Court.” 
 
 The plain language of the statutory terms “cases 
commenced” appears to encompass proceedings filed in the 
Virgin Islands courts. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 740 
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F.3d 145, 149 (3d Cir. 2014) (“‘[T]he starting point for 
interpreting a statute is the language of the statute itself.’  
When words are not defined within the statute, we construe 
them ‘in accordance with [their] ordinary or natural meaning.’  
We do not, however, do so blindly.” (citations omitted)); 
Allen ex rel. Martin v. LaSalle Bank, 629 F.3d 364, 367 (3d 
Cir. 2011) (“To discern Congress’ intent we begin with the 
text.  If the statute’s plain language is unambiguous and 
expresses that intent with sufficient precision, we need not 
look further.” (citations omitted)).  The term “case” has 
generally been understood to include judicial proceedings of 
any kind.   For instance, the Supreme Court has noted that 
“‘[t]he words “case” and “cause” are constantly used as 
synonyms in statutes . . ., each meaning a proceeding in court, 
a suit, or action.’”  Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 241 
(1998) (quoting Blyvew v. United States, 13 Wall. 581, 595, 
20 L. Ed. 638 (1871))).  “[A] ‘case’ in the broader sense” has 
been defined as “‘[a] civil or criminal proceeding, action, suit, 
or controversy at law or in equity.’”  In re Zarnel, 619 F.3d 
156, 166 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 243 
(9th ed. 2009)).  In addition, a case or cause of action has 
traditionally been understood as “commenced when it is first 
brought in an appropriate court.”  Pritchett v. Office Depot, 
Inc., 420 F.3d 1090, 1094 (10th Cir. 2005) (citing Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 3); see also, e.g., Bush v. Cheaptickets, Inc., 425 F.3d 
683, 686 (9th Cir. 2005) (“In California, as in the federal 
courts, a suit is ‘commenced’ upon filing.” (citations 
omitted)). 
 
 If it had indeed meant to strip this Court of certiorari 
jurisdiction over proceedings already filed in the Virgin 
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Islands courts before the enactment date of the legislation, 
Congress could have done so far more clearly.  In fact, it has 
done as much in the past.  For example, Congress could have 
provided that H.R. 6116 applies to “appellate cases 
commenced” or “certiorari proceedings commenced” in the 
Third Circuit on or after the date of enactment.  It evidently 
could have stripped this Court of any remaining certiorari 
jurisdiction by simply omitting any reference to an effective 
date, which is what Congress apparently did with respect to 
the Ninth Circuit’s jurisdiction over the Guam Supreme 
Court.  Santos, 436 F.3d at 1053; see also Kendall I, 716 F.3d 
at 87.  When Congress stripped the First Circuit of its 
jurisdiction over the Puerto Rico Supreme Court, it expressly 
stated that “such repeal shall not deprive the Court of Appeals 
of jurisdiction to hear and determine appeals taken to that 
court from the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico before the 
effective date of this Act.”  Act of Aug. 30, 1961, Pub. L. No. 
87-189, § 3, 75 Stat. 417 (1961).  In 1988, Congress amended 
the statutory scheme governing the Supreme Court’s 
certiorari jurisdiction.  However, in doing so, it expressly 
stated that the amendments “shall not apply to cases pending 
in the Supreme Court on the effective date of such 
amendment” (or otherwise affect the right to review of a 
judgment or decree entered before the effective date).  Act of 
June 27, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-352, § 7, 102 Stat. 662 
(1988).  Congress actually included this type of language in 
the statutory provision stripping the District Court of the 
Virgin Islands of appellate jurisdiction over local actions 
upon the creation by the Virgin Islands Legislature of a 
Virgin Islands appellate court, i.e., the legislation stated that it 
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“shall not result in the loss of jurisdiction of the district court 
over any appeal then pending in it.”  48 U.S.C. § 1613a(d). 
 
 In H.R. 6116, Congress took a different approach than 
it has in similar circumstances in the past.  In short, the 
“Effective Date” section of H.R. 6116 does not refer to a 
particular type of proceeding or a specific judicial body.  This 
section instead uses expansive and otherwise unmodified 
language in order to govern the applicability of amendments 
taking away jurisdiction from one court and granting 
jurisdiction to another—namely—“cases commenced” on or 
after the date of enactment.  Instead of enacting an exception 
reserving our jurisdiction over “pending appeals” (or even 
“pending cases”), Congress chose to make it clear that it is 
the jurisdiction-stripping (and jurisdiction-conferring) 
legislation itself that only applies to “cases commenced” on 
or after the enactment date.  Congress likewise has repeatedly 
used somewhat similar language with respect to the 
applicability of amendments made to other statutory schemes.  
These include the supplemental jurisdiction statute, Judicial 
Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-650, Title III, § 310, 
104 Stat. 5089 (1990) (“The amendments made by this 
section shall apply to civil actions commenced on or after the 
date of the enactment of this Act”), the removal jurisdiction 
statute, Judicial Improvements Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-
336, § 3(b), 100 Stat. 633 (2006) (“The Amendment made by 
this section shall apply with respect to claims in civil actions 
commenced in State courts on or after the date of the 
enactment of this section.”), and the statute governing 
removal and interlocutory appeals in class action proceedings, 
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 9, 
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119 Stat. 4 (2005) (“The amendments made by this Act shall 
apply to any civil action commenced on or after the date of 
enactment of this Act.”).  The term “cases” evidently carries a 
broader meaning than the words “civil action” used in these 
various enactments (e.g., “cases” would include both criminal 
as well as civil proceedings). 
 
 We believe that prior case law also supports our 
reading of H.R. 6116.  After all, we have indicated that 
“Congress’s recent elimination of the Third Circuit’s 
certiorari jurisdiction over decisions of the Virgin Islands 
Supreme Court does not affect, at a minimum, certiorari 
petitions filed before the effective date of the jurisdiction-
stripping act.”  Kendall II, 712 F.3d at 821 n.3 (citing Kendall 
I).  In Hamdan, the federal government filed a motion to 
dismiss a writ of certiorari pursuant to the Detainee Treatment 
Act, which was enacted after the Supreme Court had already 
granted the writ and (at least according to the federal 
government) had the immediate effect of repealing 
jurisdiction “not just over detainee habeas actions yet to be 
filed but also over any such actions then pending in any 
federal court—including this Court.”  Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 
574.  As we observed in Kendall I, the Supreme Court instead 
applied traditional rules of statutory construction to draw “the 
negative inference that Congress did not intend to eliminate 
jurisdiction over pending detainee habeas petitions where the 
statute was silent about whether its jurisdiction-stripping 
subsection applied to cases even though it expressly made 
two other subsections retroactive.”  Kendall I, 716 F.3d at 88 
(citing Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 584).  The Hamdan Court also 
rejected the theory that “jurisdiction-stripping provisions 
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automatically apply retroactively absent an express 
reservation of jurisdiction over pending cases.”  Id. at 87 
(citing Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 584). 
 
 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 
1996 (“AEDPA”) amended 28 U.S.C. § 2253 to add a new 
subsection setting forth “certificate of appealability” 
requirements governing the right to appeal in the habeas 
context.  Slack, 529 U.S. at 477-78, 480-81.  In Slack, the 
petitioner filed his habeas petition before AEDPA’s effective 
date, but the notice of appeal (as well as the district court’s 
order dismissing the petition) were filed after the legislation 
went into effect.  Id. at 479-80.  The Supreme Court 
considered “whether the pre- or post-AEDPA version of § 
2253 controls Slack’s right to appeal.”  Id. at 481.  In 
answering this question, the Slack Court took into account its 
prior AEDPA decision in Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 
(1997), in which it concluded that the new version of 28 
U.S.C. § 2254(d) (stating that no habeas relief shall be 
granted with respect to any claim adjudicated on the merits in 
state court unless the decision was contrary to, or involved an 
unreasonable application, of clearly established federal law or 
was based on an unreasonable factual determination) did not 
apply to habeas applications that were already pending when 
the statute was passed, id. at 323-27.  Applying traditional 
rules of statutory construction, the Lindh Court drew a 
negative implication from an AEDPA provision stating that a 
different part of the legislation (applicable in the capital 
context) applies to cases pending on or after the date of 
enactment.  Id. at 327 (reading provision “as indicating 
implicitly that the amendments to chapter 153 were assumed 
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and meant to apply to the general run of habeas cases only 
when those cases had been filed after the date of the Act.”).  
The Supreme Court, however, rejected Slack’s assertion that 
Lindh meant that § 2253(c) did not apply to him because he 
commenced his case in the district court before AEDPA’s 
enactment.  Slack, 529 U.S. at 481.  “[T]he [Lindh] Court 
held that AEDPA’s amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the 
statute governing entitlement to habeas relief in the district 
court, applied to cases filed after AEDPA’s effective date.”  
Id. (citing Lindh, 521 U.S. at 327).  “For purposes of 
implementing the holding in Lindh, it must be recognized that 
§ 2254 is directed to proceedings in the district courts while § 
2253 is directed to proceedings in the appellate courts.”  Id.  
In other words, because § 2254 is directed to proceedings in 
the district courts, it applies to cases filed in the district court 
after AEDPA.  Id.  Section 2253 is directed to appellate 
proceedings, and it thereby applies to appellate proceedings 
initiated post-AEDPA even if the habeas petition itself was 
filed before the effective date of this legislation.  Id.  
Although Lindh requires the court of appeals to apply pre-
AEDPA law in reviewing the district court’s ruling for cases 
commenced in the district court pre-AEDPA, the Supreme 
Court concluded that post-AEDPA law “governs the right to 
appeal in cases such as the one now before us.”  Id. 
 
 The Slack Court further explained that: 
 
While an appeal is a continuation of the 
litigation started in the trial court, it is a distinct 
step.  [Hohn, 524 U.S. at 241]; McKenzie v. A. 
Engelhard & Sons Co., [266 U.S. 131] (1924).  
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We have described proceedings in the courts of 
appeals as “appellate cases.”  E.g., Order of 
Apr. 30, 1991, 500 U.S. 1009 (amendments to 
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure “shall 
govern all proceedings in appellate cases 
thereafter commenced”).  Under AEDPA, an 
appellate case is commenced when the 
application for a COA is filed.  Hohn, [524 U.S. 
at 241].  When Congress instructs us (as Lindh 
says it has) that application of a statute is 
triggered by the commencement of a case, the 
relevant case for a statute directed to appeals is 
the one initiated in the appellate court.  Thus, § 
2253(c) governs appellate court proceedings 
filed after AEDPA’s effective date.  We see no 
indication that Congress intended to tie 
application of the provisions to the date a 
petition was filed in the district court.  The 
COA statute establishes procedural rules and 
requires a threshold inquiry into whether the 
circuit court may entertain an appeal.  [Id. at 
248]; cf. Lindh, [521 U.S. at 327].  Because 
Slack sought appellate review two years after 
AEDPA’s effective date, § 2253(c) governs his 
right to appeal. 
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Id. at 481-82.5 
 
 At least at first blush, Slack does seem to weigh in 
favor of the Government’s interpretation of H.R. 6116, i.e., 
because the legislation is supposedly directed to proceedings 
in the Third Circuit, it would purportedly then apply to 
proceedings initiated in the Third Circuit after H.R. 6116’s 
date of enactment.  Nevertheless, we do not find Slack to be 
controlling in the present circumstances.  Initially, the 
Supreme Court was not confronted with an express provision 
stating that amendments would apply to “cases commenced” 
on or after the date of enactment of the legislation.  It 
accordingly did not discuss whether there may be a 
meaningful difference between such an open-ended and 
unmodified provision and a provision that refers, for instance, 
to “appellate cases commenced.”  Cf., e.g., AEDPA, Pub. L. 
104-132, tit. IX, § 903(c), 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (providing 
that fee revision amendments apply to “cases commenced on 
or after the date of enactment” and “appellate proceedings, in 
which an appeal is perfected on or after the date of 
enactment”).  In fact, AEDPA lacked any express provision 
governing the applicability of § 2253 (or § 2254) to pending 
                                                 
5  The Supreme Court in Slack noted that the petitioner 
in Hohn had also argued that § 2253(c) did not apply because 
he had filed his habeas petition before AEDPA’s effective 
date.  Slack, 529 U.S. at 482.  “Though our opinion did not 
discuss whether § 2253(c) applied to Hohn, we would have 
had no reason to reach the issue we did resolve, that we had 
statutory certiorari jurisdiction to review the denial of a COA, 
if AEDPA did not apply at all.”  Id. 
 
38 
cases (and the Supreme Court accordingly turned to a 
provision stating that a different chapter of this habeas 
legislation “shall apply to cases pending on or after the date 
of the enactment of this Act”).  The habeas provisions at issue 
in Slack and Lindh likewise did not divest one court of its 
jurisdiction and confer such jurisdiction on another court.  In 
contrast, we must give effect to a statutory provision stating 
that amendments stripping us of certiorari jurisdiction (and 
vesting certiorari jurisdiction in the Supreme Court) apply to 
“cases commenced” on or after the date of enactment.  The 
statutory language at issue, Congress’s use of both similar 
and dissimilar language in other related contexts, and prior 
case law all weigh in favor of reading this statutory provision 
as “referring to the filing of a complaint in the Superior 
Court”—and we do not believe that the Supreme Court’s 
ruling in Slack alters our conclusion. 
 
 We likewise reject the Government’s assertion that the 
intent of H.R. 6116 “can only be accomplished only if the 
Supreme Court of the United States assumes exclusive 
jurisdiction over certiorari petitions filed after December 28, 
2012, the effective date of the act.”  (Respondent’s 
Jurisdiction Brief at 4.)  We acknowledge that Congress 
passed and the President signed H.R. 6116 after “a committee 
of this Court recommended to the Third Circuit Judicial 
Council that Congress eliminate our certiorari jurisdiction 
over Virgin Islands Supreme Court decisions in favor of 
direct review by the United States Supreme Court” because 
the new court had succeeded in developing sufficient 
institutional traditions to justify such direct review.  Kendall 
I, 716 F.3d at 86 (citation omitted).  In other words, the court 
 
39 
created by the Virgin Islands Legislature passed its test “with 
flying colors.”  Id. (citation omitted).  Nevertheless, taken to 
its logical conclusion, the notion that there is no longer any 
reason for us to review decisions by the Virgin Islands 
Supreme Court would indicate that we should also lose 
jurisdiction even where the certiorari petition was filed or 
granted before H.R. 6116’s enactment date.  Although it 
could have taken this step (and evidently has done so in the 
past, see, e.g., id. at 87), Congress instead chose to include an 
explicit provision making it clear that its jurisdiction-stripping 
amendments only apply to “cases commenced” on or after the 
enactment date.  We accordingly have already determined 
that we retain jurisdiction with respect to proceedings in 
which the certiorari petitions were either granted or filed 
before this date.  We add that, like litigants who filed their 
certiorari petitions before December 28, 2012, parties who 
were in the midst of litigating a proceeding in the Virgin 
Islands courts could have reasonably expected that they 
would have the right to file a petition for certiorari with the 
Third Circuit and, at the very least, possibly obtain further 
review with respect to questions of Virgin Islands law (which 
would otherwise not be available in the Supreme Court).  
After all, the Government and the Union commenced their 
respective Virgin Islands Superior Court actions in 2011, and 
the Virgin Islands Supreme Court, in turn, did not render its 
own decision until November 2012.  We find it improbable 
that H.R. 6116 was ever meant to strip this Court of certiorari 
jurisdiction when the enactment date of this legislation fell 
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right in the middle of the applicable time period for filing a 
certiorari petition with this Court.6    
                                                 
6 Likewise, we must reject the Government’s theory 
that the Union’s approach to H.R. 6116 would result in both 
the Supreme Court and this Court possessing concurrent 
jurisdiction.  On the contrary, “we retain certiorari 
jurisdiction over all cases ‘commenced’ before the President 
signed H.R. 6116,” Kendall I, 716 F.3d at 88 (citation 
omitted), and we now conclude that such cases include 
proceedings commenced in the Virgin Islands courts before 
that date.  In turn, the Supreme Court would not possess 
jurisdiction over such cases.  For “cases commenced” on or 
after this date, the Supreme Court possesses exclusive 
certiorari jurisdiction. 
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We have also considered the various contentions 
regarding H.R. 6116 proffered by the Virgin Islands Supreme 
Court in its amicus curiae brief.  However, we reject its 
critique of our interpretation of this federal statute.  For 
instance, we purportedly “distinguished the Santos case by 
stating that, shortly thereafter, the U.S. Supreme Court, in 
[Hamdan], ‘rejected the theory that jurisdiction-stripping 
provisions apply retroactively in the absence of an express 
reservation for pending cases,’ and thus implicitly rejected the 
reasoning of Santos.”  (Amicus Curiae Brief at 20 (quoting 
UIW-SIU, 746 F.3d at 125).)  According to the Virgin Islands 
Supreme Court, our reading of Hamdan is incorrect because 
the Supreme Court endorsed the reasoning in Santos in 
Limtiaco v. Camacho, 549 U.S. 482 (2007), a post-Hamdan 
proceeding from the Guam Supreme Court.  However, it was 
the Kendall I Court that disposed of Santos based on the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Hamdan:  “To the extent that 
Santos interprets Supreme Court precedent as holding that 
jurisdiction-stripping provisions automatically apply 
retroactively absent an express reservation of jurisdiction over 
pending cases, the Supreme Court subsequently rejected such 
an approach in Hamdan.  See Hamdan, [548 U.S. at 584] 
(rejecting this ‘inflexible’ rule advanced by Justice Scalia’s 
dissent and by the Government).”  Kendall I, 716 F.3d at 87.  
We further explained in Kendall I that, “[m]ore importantly, 
the jurisdiction-stripping provision in Santos differs markedly 
from the one we confront here” because the Ninth Circuit 
“addressed a statute in which Congress was completely silent 
about the effective date of the jurisdiction-stripping 
provision.”  Id. (citing Santos, 436 F.3d at 1053).  In contrast, 
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B. Mootness 
 
 Even though we thereby retain certiorari jurisdiction 
under H.R. 6116, we nevertheless must dismiss the certiorari 
petition as moot because of Bason’s death. 
 
 Federal courts generally lack jurisdiction whenever 
“‘“the issues presented are no longer live or the parties lack a 
legally cognizable interest in the outcome.”’”  McNair v. 
Synapse Group Inc., 672 F.3d 213, 224 n.11 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(quoting Merle v. United States, 351 F.3d 92, 94 (3d Cir. 
2003)).  The mootness determination implicates an intensely 
factual inquiry requiring the court to assess whether it could 
award meaningful relief despite changing circumstances.  
See, e.g., Int’l Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Kelly, 815 F.2d 912, 
914-16 (3d Cir. 1987).  “The mootness doctrine is centrally 
concerned with the court’s ability to grant effective relief.”  
County of Morris v. Nationalist Movement, 273 F.3d 527, 
                                                                                                             
Congress used explicit language providing that “H.R. 6116’s 
amendments apply only ‘to cases commenced on or after the 
date of the enactment.’”  Id. at 88.  In any event, the Limtiaco 
Court did not address (or even mention) the existence of an 
express reservation rule for jurisdiction-stripping statutes 
(and, on the contrary,  it addressed, inter alia, the distinct 
question of “whether the filing of a petition for certiorari or 
the pendency of a writ of certiorari before the Court of 
Appeals suspended the finality of the Guam Supreme Court’s 
judgment for purposes of the 90-day period [to file a petition 
for certiorari with the Supreme Court] set out in [28 U.S.C.] § 
2101(c)),” Limtiaco, 549 U.S. at 487).   
 
43 
533 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum 
Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 698-99 (3d Cir. 1996)).  As the Union 
notes, an otherwise lawful order does not become moot 
merely because changes in circumstances indicate that the 
need for the order may be less then when it was originally 
entered.  See, e.g., C-B Buick, Inc. v. NLRB, 506 F.2d 1087, 
1093 (3d Cir. 1974).  Additionally, voluntary compliance or 
cessation of the allegedly unlawful conduct on the part of the 
defendant generally does not render a case as moot.  See, e.g., 
Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 721, 727 (2013) 
(stating that party claiming voluntary compliance carries 
formidable burden of showing that it is absolutely clear that 
allegedly wrongful conduct could not reasonably be expected 
to recur); Dep’t of Justice v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 991 
F.2d 285, 289 (5th Cir. 1993) (“[Unfair labor practice] cases, 
however, generally do not become moot when the individual 
parties resolve the specific matter that gave rise to the dispute 
because the ‘Board is entitled to have the resumption of the 
unfair practice barred by an enforcement decree.’” (quoting 
NLRB v. Raytheon Co., 398 U.S. 25, 27 (1970))).  “Instead, 
the dismissal of an action on mootness grounds requires the 
defendant to demonstrate that ‘there is no reasonable 
expectation that the wrong will be repeated.’”  Sutton v. 
Rasheed, 323 F.3d 236, 248 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting 
Northeastern Fla. Chapter of Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Am. 
v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 662 (1993)).  “[T]he 
‘capable of repetition yet evading review’ doctrine permits 
consideration of a case that ‘would otherwise be deemed 
moot’ when ‘“(1) the challenged action is, in its duration, too 
short to be fully litigated prior to cessation or expiration, and 
(2) there is a reasonable expectation that the same 
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complaining party will be subject to the same action again.”’”  
McNair, 672 F.3d at 224 n.11 (quoting Merle, 351 F.3d at 
94). 
 
 We do not believe that the current certiorari 
proceeding falls under the “capable of repetition yet evading 
review” doctrine.  According to the Union, H.R. 6116 
forecloses review of Virgin Islands Supreme Court decisions 
on questions of Virgin Islands law, and any future 
reinstatement issue that may arise between the Union and the 
Government thereby will forever evade review.  A statute 
stripping a federal circuit court of certiorari jurisdiction over 
final decisions of the highest court of a territory (and vesting 
the Supreme Court with certiorari jurisdiction at least with 
respect to questions of federal law) does not appear to 
represent the type of occurrence that could implicate this 
doctrine.  In any event, we have already concluded that we 
retain certiorari jurisdiction with respect to proceedings that 
were filed in the Virgin Islands courts before H.R. 6116’s 
date of enactment, including the proceedings filed by the 
Union and the Government in 2011.  Furthermore, it is 
Bason’s death that moots the current certiorari proceeding, 
and this unfortunate and seemingly unexpected occurrence 
does not render this case capable of repetition yet evading 
review.  Cf., e.g., Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 
F.3d 790, 796 n.4 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (“We would think 
that a distinction could reasonably be drawn between the 
terminally ill, all of whom necessarily will die prior to 
completion of the litigation, and those whose cases become 
moot for more mundane or less predictable reasons.”), rev’d 
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on other grounds sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 
U.S. 702 (1997). 
 
 The Union vigorously contends that it is the real party 
in interest here.  For our part, we recognize that a labor 
union’s interest may extend beyond merely protecting the 
rights of an allegedly injured employee and that it accordingly 
may have a right to advocate on behalf of other similarly 
situated members as well as the collective bargaining unit as a 
whole.  In American Federation of Government Employees, 
Local 1941 v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, 837 F.2d 
495 (D.C. Cir. 1988), a local of the American Federation of 
Government Employees (“AFGE”) sought review of a 
decision of the Federal Labor Relations Authority (“FLRA”), 
holding “that the credentials committee of an Army hospital 
about to conduct a hearing to consider adverse information 
relating to the medical procedures and proficiency of a 
certified ophthalmologist employed at the hospital did not 
commit an unfair labor practice when it refused the 
employee’s request to have his union representative with him 
at the hearing,” id. at 496.  Although the doctor resigned from 
his position and died a short time after the hospital 
commander had adopted the committee’s recommendations to 
restrict his privileges, id. at 497, the D.C. Circuit allowed the 
union to pursue an unlawful labor practice action: 
 
This controversy is not mooted by Dr. Hanna’s 
death.  As exclusive representative of Dr. 
Hanna’s bargaining unit, AFGE has a derivative 
right to be present, on the employee’s request, 
at an examination reasonably believed by the 
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employee potentially to result in disciplinary 
action.  5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(2)(B).  Thus the 
Union itself has standing to contest the denial of 
representation as an unfair employment 
practice.  Available remedies may include a 
cease and desist order or the posting of an 
unfair labor practice notice.  See, e.g., AFGE v. 
FLRA, 777 F.2d 751, 753 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 
1985). 
 
Id. at 497 n.2.; see also, e.g., Dep’t of Justice v. FLRA, 144 
F.3d 90, 91-96 (D.C. 1998) (rejecting INS’s theory that union 
was not acting as exclusive representative at oral reply stage 
of disciplinary proceedings on grounds that union sought to 
vindicate employees’ individual interests as well as 
bargaining unit’s broader interest in proper administration of 
collective bargaining agreement and likewise rejecting 
union’s request to sanction INS for pursuing appeal after its 
alleged destruction of certain documents because whether 
agency committed unfair labor practice in refusing to produce 
documents was unaffected by whether agency later destroyed 
such documents); AFGE, Local 3090, 777 F.2d at 753 n.13 
(“This ‘other action’ may include the posting of a notice 
indicating that an agency has been found to have committed 
an unfair labor practice and that it has been ordered to cease 
committing such practices in the future.  An order requiring 
the Home to post such a notice would of course afford [the 
union] an as yet unrealized remedy for the alleged unfair 
labor practice.” (citation omitted)). 
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Furthermore, it is well established that, even though 
the death of a former employee may moot a reinstatement 
claim, a claim for back pay nevertheless survives his or her 
death.  See, e.g., Scott v. Univ. of Del., 601 F.2d 76, 81 n.8 
(3d Cir. 1979) (“We address the merits of Scott’s individual 
[discrimination] claims because the claim for back pay and 
damages survives his death.”); abrogated on other grounds, 
EF Operating Corp. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 993 
F.2d 1046 (3d Cir. 1993); NLRB v. Atl. Towing Co., 179 
F.2d 497, 498 (5th Cir. 1950) (“Since the issuance of said 
[NLRB] order [requiring reinstatement with full 
reimbursement], Hendrix has died, but this does not render 
the case moot because, if the court sustains the order, 
Hendrix’s estate is entitled to be made whole for any loss of 
pay suffered by him”). 
 
Nevertheless, the current certiorari proceeding presents 
this Court with an unusual and even unique set of 
circumstances.  In short, the Virgin Islands Supreme Court’s 
order and opinion was entirely premised on the notion of 
reinstatement, and it would have dismissed the Government’s 
appeal if the Virgin Islands Superior Court had never ordered 
Bason’s immediate reinstatement.  In its submission on 
mootness, the Union quotes the Virgin Islands Supreme 
Court’s holding “‘that section 113 of title 3 precluded the 
arbitrator and the Superior Court from mandating that the 
Government reinstate Bason as an Assistant Attorney 
General’” (Petitioner’s Mootness Letter at 3 (quoting UIW-
SIU, 2012 WL 5901921, at *5)) together with the statement 
that “‘it is not clear to this Court how the provisions of [the 
CBA] which permit reinstatement by an arbitrator of an 
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Assistant Attorney General discharged without just cause can 
in any way be reconciled with the statutory enactment’” (id. 
at 3-4 (quoting UIW-SIU, 2012 WL 5901921, at *5)).  
Specifically, the Virgin Islands Supreme Court concluded 
that, “[s]ince the portion of the December 13, 2011 Opinion 
and Judgment mandating Bason’s reinstatement constituted 
an appealable injunction, this Court possesses jurisdiction 
over that portion of the underlying order.”  UIW-SIU, 2012 
WL 5901921, at *5.  It then proceeded to reverse the Virgin 
Islands Superior Court’s opinion and judgment to the extent 
that it directed the Government to reinstate Bason.  However, 
the Virgin Islands Supreme Court also dismissed the appeal 
“with respect to all other issues” (A22) because it agreed with 
the Union that the parties’ disagreement as to the calculation 
of back pay “precludes us from exercising jurisdiction,” id. at 
*3 (citation omitted).  On remand, the Virgin Islands Superior 
Court has not yet disposed of the claim for back pay. 
 
Bason’s death clearly moots any reinstatement claim 
on his behalf.  See, e.g., Scott, 601 F.2d at 81 n.8 (“Insofar as 
Scott sought injunctive and declaratory relief compelling the 
University to reinstate him and renew his contract, these 
claims have been mooted by Scott’s death.”); Loveman, 
Joseph & Loeb v. NLRB, 146 F.2d 769, 772 (5th Cir. 1945) 
(“Furthermore, her death has rendered the question of her 
reinstatement moot.”).  Given the critical role that 
reinstatement played in the Virgin Islands Supreme Court’s 
disposition, we do not see how we could reach the merits of 
its decision at this juncture.  In other words, reinstatement 
represents the critical “hook” on which this entire certiorari 
proceeding rests, and, without it, “‘“the parties lack a legally 
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cognizable interest in the outcome”’” of the certiorari 
proceeding itself.  McNair, 672 F.3d at 224 n.11 (citation 
omitted).  The proceeding thereby involves more than either 
changed circumstances indicating that the need for an order 
may be less than when it was first entered or voluntary 
compliance on the part of the Government.  Likewise, this 
proceeding does not implicate, inter alia, the right of a union 
“to be present, on the employee’s request, at an examination 
reasonably believed by the employee potentially to result in 
disciplinary action.”  AFGE, Local 1941, 837 F.2d at 497 n.2.  
While the issue of back pay may not be moot, this particular 
claim is not before us because the Virgin Islands Supreme 
Court concluded that it lacked appellate jurisdiction over this 
claim, which has yet to be decided by the Virgin Islands 
Superior Court.  In fact, it appears that the Union (or Bason’s 
estate) could continue to litigate the claim for back pay (and 
possibly other claims for relief given Bason’s death) in the 
Virgin Islands courts.  If the Union (or the estate or the 
Government) does not prevail before the Virgin Islands 
courts, it then could file a certiorari petition with us (and, as 
we have explained, H.R. 6116 would not strip us of 
jurisdiction over such a petition). 
 
Therefore, we will dismiss the certiorari petition filed 
by the Union.  In addition, we will vacate the Virgin Islands 
Supreme Court’s order and opinion and will remand with 
instructions to the Virgin Islands Supreme Court to vacate the 
portions of the Virgin Islands Superior Court’s judgment and 
opinion that addressed the issue of reinstatement.  The 
Supreme Court has explained that “[t]he established practice 
of the Court in dealing with a civil case from a court in the 
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federal system which has become moot while on its way here 
or pending our decision on the merits is to reverse or vacate 
the judgment below and remand with a direction to dismiss.”  
Munsingwear, 340 U.S. at 39 (footnote omitted).  
Accordingly, our normal practice is to vacate the district court 
judgment when a civil case becomes moot on appeal.  See 
also, e.g., Lightner v. 1621 Route 22 W. Operating Co., 729 
F.3d 235, 237 (3d Cir. 2013).  While this proceeding does not 
come to us from a district court, we believe that this general 
rule applies with respect to our certiorari jurisdiction over 
decisions by the Virgin Islands Supreme Court. 7  Insofar as 
                                                 
7 According to the Virgin Islands Supreme Court, this 
Court lack supervisory authority over the Virgin Islands 
judiciary, and the Munsingwear rule thereby does not apply in 
the present circumstances.  As the Union points out, it 
appears that the Supreme Court has, on more than one 
occasion, vacated the underlying state court judgment (and 
remanded for further proceedings) after the case became 
moot.  See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 320 (1974) 
(“Accordingly, the judgment of the Supreme Court of 
Washington is vacated, and the cause is remanded for such 
proceedings as by that court may be deemed appropriate.”); 
Amalgamated Ass’n of Street, Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach 
Emps., Div. 998 v. Wis. Emp. Relations Bd., 340 U.S. 416, 
418 (1951) (“It appearing that the cause has become moot, the 
judgment of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin is vacated 
without costs and the cause is remanded for such proceedings 
as by that court may be deemed appropriate.”); see also, e.g., 
Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576, 585 (1989) (plurality 
opinion) (“When the sole question on which we granted 
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certiorari has become moot, our usual course, in cases coming 
to us from state courts when part of the dispute remains alive, 
is to vacate the judgment below and remand for further 
proceedings.”  (citing DeFunis, 416 U.S. at 584)).   
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However, we need not—and do not—decide the 
specific question of whether the Munsingwear rule generally 
applies in the state court context.  In short, our relationship 
with the Virgin Islands Supreme Court differs from the 
relationship that exists between the Supreme Court and state 
courts.  “Our Court has had a significant role in overseeing 
the Virgin Islands Supreme Court.”  Defoe, 702 F.3d at 742 
(citing § 1613; Pichardo, 613 F.3d at 100 n.11).  Under the 
pre-amended version of § 1613, the relations between this 
Court and the Virgin Islands judiciary “shall be governed by 
the laws of the United States pertaining to the relations 
between the courts of the United States, including the 
Supreme Court of the United States, and the courts of the 
several States”—with one major exception—“Provided, That 
for the first fifteen years following the establishment of the 
appellate court authorized by section 1611(a) of this title, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit shall 
have jurisdiction to review by writ of certiorari all final 
decisions of the highest court of the Virgin Islands from 
which a decision could be had.”   While H.R. 6116 may have 
stricken this certiorari jurisdiction language, he have already 
concluded in this opinion that we retain certiorari jurisdiction 
over proceedings that were filed in the Virgin Islands courts 
before the date of enactment of H.R. 6116.  Unlike the 
Supreme Court, our certiorari jurisdiction is not limited to 
questions of federal law, and we thereby retain jurisdiction 
over questions of Virgin Islands law.  See, e.g., Defoe, 702 
F.3d at 743.  “In other words, the [Virgin Islands] Supreme 
Court has assumed our erstwhile role as a final authority on 
territorial law, though with an important limitation:  its 
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Bason’s death prevents us from considering the merits of the 
Virgin Islands Supreme Court’s decision, we will “clear[] the 
path” for future relitigation of the issues between the parties, 
eliminate a judgment that could not be reviewed due to 
happenstance, and ensure that the parties are “not prejudiced 
by a decision which in the statutory scheme was only 
preliminary.”  Munsingwear, 340 U.S. at 40. 
 
III. 
                                                                                                             
decisions must not be manifestly erroneous or inescapably 
wrong.”  Id.   Given our special relationship with the Virgin 
Islands Supreme Court, we believe that it is appropriate to 
clear the proverbial path for future relitigation and eliminate a 
judgment that has become unreviewable by mere 
happenstance.  See, e.g., Munsingwear, 340 U.S. at 40.  In 
fact, it appears that a failure to take such a step would unfairly 
prejudice the Union itself, which—but for Bason’s untimely 
death—would have evidently obtained review on the merits 
of the Virgin Islands Supreme Court’s decision in this 
certiorari proceeding.  See, e.g., Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2035-
36 (“In this case, the happenstance of S.G.’s moving across 
country and becoming an adult has deprived Camreta of his 
appeal rights.  Mootness has frustrated his ability to challenge 
the Court of Appeals’ ruling that he must obtain a warrant 
before interviewing a suspected child abuse victim at school.  
We therefore vacate the part of the Ninth Circuit’s opinion 
that addressed that issue, and remand for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.”  (footnote omitted) (citations 
omitted)).        
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For the foregoing reasons, we will dismiss the Union’s 
certiorari petition as moot.  We also will vacate the Virgin 
Islands Supreme Court’s order and opinion and will remand 
with instructions to the Virgin Islands Supreme Court to 
vacate the portions of the Virgin Islands Superior Court’s 
judgment and opinion that addressed the issue of 
reinstatement. 
